I remember, when I was possibly six or seven, that one night I was crying uncontrollably because I realized that at one time I would have to die, and this meant non-existence. This happened several nights. Thoughts stormed all over my head, from “what is non-existence”, to “how does it feel”, “how do we know it”, etc. My mother tried to console me by saying that we live on forever in the memories of others, of those who loved us; incredibly cute, but this did not console me, I started to think of this too strictly, as in an actual life within the body of others. 

Time flew by, and eventually I made peace with death via a lie, as most people do. I told myself that I was indeed fine with dying and not ever coming back and with non-existence. In reality, I (and indeed no one) is fine with non-existence. It is an ontological contradiction that a Being (as in Dasein, as in being-in-the-world) cannot be reconciled with the idea of not-Being. It is against biological mechanisms of survival. One can think of people who try to take their lives (suicide) and assert that these people are at peace with death (as non-existence). However, this is epistemologically incorrect. To be at peace, or in accordance with non-existence, one would have to understand what non-existence is so as to be factually in peace with it, i.e. if one knows what non-existence is, and further, comprehends it, then this person can, and only then can, assert they are at peace with non-existence. Of course, there is no possible way for us (as Beings who are being-in-the-world) to understand the not-being. Hence, what one can only ever be at peace is with not knowing what non-being entails. To illustrate this, think of any action which requires your acceptance, perhaps something easy like running with a friend on a Sunday morning. One can only say that they agree (or are in peace) to running with our friend if we set out parameters, i.e. where, how long, and how intensely. Furthermore, to make such a decision we relate the future event with previous experience: how was the last time this happened? In sum, information (to the extent that we can possibly conceive it) informs decisions, and regarding non-existence, we cannot possibly acquire any information. 

The previous paragraph was only to establish my acknowledgement of my own unacceptance of non-existence. You can agree or not with my assessment, and I welcome challenging views, for indeed I am in the constant lookout for assimilation to death. However, given that at present time I cannot say I can make peace with non-existence, my mind has digressed to a multiplicity of possibilities in which even when my materiality perishes, I am (as a being-in-the-world) still present. Ontologically, I understand Beings as constituted through processes and through systems, which is my understanding of Heidegger’s Dasein. That is, being-in-the-world is life transpiring through the processes of life itself, and whenever we (as humans) live life through those processes, we are always in relation to others; we are mutually responsible for the existence of others, and others are responsible for our existence. Perhaps this can be simplified as follows: one is always in a moment, and one is always part of something. Again, I invite challenges to this ontological conception, but as to my struggle with non-existence, this conception is important. 

Regarding the process aspect of the Being, there is another dimension. Not only are we always part of a moment, but the preceding moments have constituted our existence. Nothing is ours, and we bring forth nothing. Think of it this way: what we create is only possible due to the preceding innovations. Kropotkin heavily influenced me with this idea, but one can synthesize it as follows: any innovation is the product of humanity in its totality. Think of the computer. Indeed it is a modern image, but we would not have gotten to the computer if it were not for the cybernetic movement, which would not exist if it were not for Wittgenstein’s logic, and Aristotle. Further, knowledge upon metals, and so on. We can trace everything we have now to the past; we owe it to them. This perhaps would make an interesting essay on the question concerning technology, but I will do that later. For now we are interested in the ontological understanding. 

This conception of being, dragged to the individual human, entails the following: I am never indeed an individual understood as the smallest unit of analysis, as being distinct and indivisible —i.e. there is no atomic individual. For the I, indeed the Being, is constituted by the ancestors. This is true materially and ideationally. My face, the one I see in the mirror, is the process of thousands of years of face combinations. My height, my genes, my looks, my material reality is constituted by processes and systems. It is beautiful to see that my face resembles so much that of my father’s. Furthermore, ideationally, my beliefs, my way of understanding the world, and even more so, my idiom, my body language, is a reflection of my parents, and theirs is a reflection of theirs. However, without reducing the importance of this, it is important to acknowledge that there are other factors which create differences among individuals, for we are not mere copies, epigenetic play a huge role, the changing material conditions of the world also shape the way in which I am shaped. To put it logically: Father (including their ancestors) ∧ Mother (including their ancestors) = Me, is not true. Nevertheless, there are traceable characteristics which I owe to them. Ergo, given that our being is constituted how I have mentioned, it is reasonable and indeed logical to argue the following: Just as I am constituted by what came before me, I will constitute what comes after me. 

This is where I have found some way to cheat non-existence. My being-in-the-world will not end with my material reality, it will go on to live through those who I help constitute: my children, and the people who I influence. This, I believe, is beautiful, for it is equivalent to say that I am (partly) my children, and I am (partly) the people I love. And as such, I will live forever, only through different representations. 

Of course the following items of analysis are missing: the feedback effect on the preceding by the following (e.g. my being-in-the-world affects that of my father’s which affects me), agency and distinction parameters (e.g. to which extent am I and I, and to which extent am I the sum), and lastly a thorough materialistic understanding of the body and mind relation. Perhaps I have chosen to not delve into these aspects because in there lies a counter to my eternal existence, but also, perhaps, I will analyze this eventually.