For the past months I have struggled with several ideas pertaining to democratic theory. First, on the question of legitimacy (“what gives rulers legitimacy”). Second, on the methods towards electing —and maintaining— a leader (i.e., either presidentialism or parliamentarism, but also exact mechanisms of representation, either representative democracy or direct democracy). Third, and above all, relating to the perils of liberal democracy, the possibility of, what I will call, exhaustive alternation: on the possibility of incorporating qualitatively different forms of ruling, not solely different ideologies within the bounds of liberal democracy (e.g. Party A or Party B), but rather an Other system.  While these catalytic themes have been present since I have been interested in political philosophy, it has only been after attending a course on Modern Conservatism and Machiavellism, that I have really invested my time towards looking for answers. Having read texts which are very against my own beliefs, but finding in (almost) all, a similar critique to the present system, with drastically different solutions, to those of 20th century critical theorists (Foucault, Habermas, Adorno, Honneth, and most important to the present enquiry Dussel), demanded from me an in-depth analysis of their propositions.¹ Hence, I decided to start reading on Dussel and the philosophy of liberation. 

It is a shame that European universities often disregard his philosophy and only mention him in passing whenever 20th century philosophy is taught, for they only prove that Eurocentrism and (as he would call it) greek-roman thought are still valued higher; regardless of how many poor and fetishizing seminars are dedicated to Fanon, Said and Césaire.² It is a shame, for in his thought I have found several illuminating insights, including a different disposition, and understanding, towards and of philosophy. For example, Dussel has recommended philosophers of the periphery (both in terms of their present location, and their place of origin), to treat the myth philosophically, and from it derive to valuable political philosophical insights.³ However, what has remained with me the most, partly because of my utter rejection during my first read, was his understanding of the necessity, of political leaders in order to have change. I will develop his argument, and the similarity it has with James Burnham’s thought, later on. For now I present my thesis against it: Dussel, either because of blind hope, or a mistaken understanding of leadership, treats the leader, as necessary in the politics of liberation, without questioning that leaders are susceptible to corrupting their ideals, and betraying the pueblo. For the messiah is not a categorization/concept that is vested but rather self-proclaimed, and in as much as it is not vested, it is thus not possible to be extracted. Thus, I propose that, while leadership and rulers are indeed necessary for any political functioning, there is a necessity to rethink who, as in the person possessing what qualities, might be the leader in a politics of liberation. 

A note before I start: I have not read all of Dussel’s work, nor do I believe to be in possession of exhaustive knowledge of his philosophy. All of the claims that I will analyze here are derived from his 2015 book Filosofías del Sur [Philosophies of the South]. Hence, it is possible that elsewhere Dussel clarifies a point made here. Nonetheless, vesting Philosophies of the South with epistemic strength, I treat his points as strongmen, and will not resort to logical fallacies.  

For Dussel, in order to instigate change, two key components are needed (1) a pueblo, who has (2) faith, as (2a)“[the belief, as subjective conviction that allows opposition to the unjust ‘rule of law’”,  but also (2b) faith-in-someone.⁴ 

It is readily observable how his conception is tied to theology, given the reference to faith. Discussed by him thoroughly in the preceding chapter, he “[extracts the moldy symbolic narratives that reside and are studied in the faculty of theology, to situate them […] in the faculty of philosophy]”.⁵ Paul’s Epistles, philosophically studied, offer the following: “when law denies life, we must know to deny law”.⁶ Such denial-of-law, occurs by (1) the pueblo. The (1) pueblo originates once “[the political community cleaves]” from the totality.⁷ The cleavage (escisión, from Greek: aforismós), being “[the oppressed and excluded part, [who] gain creating-presence from a dimension that keeps certain exteriority”,⁸ is thus those who were oppressed by the unjust system and gain consciousness of such oppression, and who want to change the totality with an Other. 

The (1) pueblo, has (2) faith. Dussel, in the chapter discussing change, refers to only belief as subjective conviction, and belief as faith in someone (the former [2a], and the latter [2b]). However, reading Dussel, I further differentiate the subjective belief in two: (2a’) faith-in-the-Other and (2a’’) faith-in-the-Other-system. (2a’) Faith for the Other, is not mere fraternité —from the French Revolution. Faith-for-the-Other, referred as solidarity, is, Dussel tells us:

[Derived] from the Greek term to refer to brotherly love, both in terms of the law and the agapé, proper of the messianic community. The agapé is a love for the Other as an other, a love from responsibility for the full realization of the Other, it is a love from service and availability that supersedes fraternité, as friendship of the Law community. 

[…] It is the love (that is effectively not “internal”, but rather intersubjective, historical, and politically subversive) that solidifies the messianic “rest”, that gives strength to take on danger.⁹

Faith-in-the-Other-System is strictly speaking, the conviction derived from solidarity, in creating, attempting, and implementing a radically different system. In sum, the pueblo, composed of those who are oppressed by the unjust system, appears at the moment of conscientiousness of their status as oppressed. The pueblo, the conscious oppressed, have solidarity for one another, and have faith in a different system which they ought to implement. However, the implementation of the different system will not result in a tyranny of the majority (in Arendt’s terms, so to speak), but the “pueblo will rescue, redeem all the community (confused and divided), will save the patria, the populus as a future project […] even against the will of the dominators”.¹⁰ That is, the change will be intrinsically good for all.

From the above presented analysis, it is not clear why Dussel believes leaders are necessary. Nonetheless, Dussel asserts that: “the pueblo might be rationally convinced of a political plan, but subjectively it must objectify in someone, in their honesty, wholeness, courage, wisdom, to give them the mandate of being in charge of the, shared, responsibility of getting to the strategic goal”.¹¹ Why would the pueblo not be able to objectify in itself? This question is not addressed here by Dussel. Interestingly, here lies a similitude between Dussel and Burnham, which although small is significant, for Burnham, as a Machiavellian, believes that several factors “work […] to create within the organization a leadership”.¹² For example, “many of the group’s decisions must be made quickly if the organized group is not to be severely weakened or destroyed”.¹³ Which is also acknowledged by Dussel: “[and this [the necessity of leadership] is because in fighting, in war, there must frequently be made choices which are instant, difficult, and complex”.¹⁴ In both, leadership appears as necessary. 

But, where Dussel draws short is in his normative appeal to legitimacy and authority. Dussel asserts that “[leadership has authority invested in it by the same pueblo who needs a certain guidance […] the pueblo creates the myth of authority, the pueblo needs it, it supports it, it manages it, and it can suffer a great disillusion”.¹⁵ As such, Dussel, while grounding authority a posteriori and subjectively, defies the possibility of authority maintaining its status, and no longer being in accordance with the pueblo. Since it is up to the pueblo who has authority, if a leader fails, the pueblo no longer recognizes the leader as authority, but this does not strip power from the fallen leader. Authority and power are not subjective, they are observable and, to some extent, possible to measure (e.g. in the capacity of the authority to ensure certain behavior does not happen). 

This is what Burnham understands best. Burnham asserts how “in spite of the forms and doctrines of democracy, the leaders are in a position to control and dominate the mass”.¹⁶ This is because, “leaders […] have effective control of the organization’s finances”,¹⁷ publicity and propaganda are carried out by the leadership,¹⁸ and “the leaders […] administer, in part or altogether, the disciplinary mechanism of the organization”.¹⁹ Mass movements, or the pueblo, also require funding in order to continue their existence, they have publicity and propaganda (nowadays mostly in social media), and, even when not in the form of a state, can have disciplining mechanisms such as ostracizing a member from the community. Hence, once leadership is gained (or even ascribed), the leader possesses mechanisms to control the mass or the pueblo. As such, “[demanding them [the leaders] obedience towards the movement’s consensus]”²⁰, as Dussel calls for, is mere infantilism, for, once a leader, the leader obtains power over the pueblo. 

Having noted the control mechanisms of control that leaders possess against the pueblo, it is thus important to consider how it is possible to overcome such problems, taking for granted that leadership is necessary but that it has possible control mechanisms. Dussel, implicitly, refers towards leadership as a one person job, since he alludes to the visible leadership of some individual leaders in Latin America. It is worth noting, however, and siding with Burnham, that leadership is never a one person job. In the words of Mosca, cited by Burnham, “the man who is at the head of the state would certainly not be able to govern without the support of a numerous class to enforce respect for his orders”.²¹ This is indeed true, governing, either a country or an organization, always requires several people. Hence, when thinking about possible buffers against leader’s one must think of the broader picture, of the totality. 

I conclude now, having demonstrated Dussel’s shortcomings in what is a beautiful and masterful piece. If a philosophy of liberation is true in its intentions, then it must take seriously the question of leadership. Latin America has seen and lived the promises of messiahs who take their pueblo, the oppressed who love the Other as an other, only to be left abandoned. I wonder truly if there is a possible solution to the problem or question of authority and leadership. For the time being, I have no answer, partly because I have not yet read enough, and partly because I do not want to be disillusioned by my own shortcomings. Despite this, I continue to inform myself, to embark on an epistemological journey, one that is disregarded by Eurocentrism, and one which hopes to bring about an Other system. More to come on Dussel.

Notes:

1. I hope to one day write on the similitude between 20th century conservative thought and the Frankfurt School, specifically on their critique of reason. This area of inquiry is, for the time being, left untouched, although I welcome anyone pointing me to any literature regarding this.
2. In this critique I do want to exclude those professors who, in their courses, include thinkers from a wide array of countries, schools of thought, and, overall, place-of-enunciation, of which I have had the opportunity to have, precisely in the course of Modern Machivelism.
3. See Dussel, E. (2015). Filosofías Del Sur. Descolonización y Transmodernismo. Akal, chapters 1 and 2.  
4. Dussel 2015, pp.261.
5. Idem, pp. 116
6.  Idem, pp. 179 
7.  Idem, pp. 246.  
8.  Idem, pp. 139. 
9. Idem, pp. 157.
10. Idem, pp. 251.
11. Idem, pp. 261.
12. Burnham, J. (2020). The Machiavellians. Defenders of Freedom, Lume Books: pp. 130.
13. Idem, pp. 129.
14.  Dussel 2015, pp. 261. 
15.  Idem, pp. 263. 
16.  Burnham 2015, pp. 137. 
17. Ibid.
18.  Idem, pp. 140.  
19.  Idem, pp. 141. 
20.  Dussel 2015, pp. 265. 
21.  Burnham 2015, pp. 80.